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Spousal Probate Rights in a
Multiple-Marriage Society
By LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER*
The Twentieth Mortimer H. Hess Memorial Lecture,
delivered at the House of the Association on December
4, 1989.
Nearly everyone knows about the transformation of the Ameri-
can family that has taken place over the last couple of decades.
The changes comprise one of the great events of our age-from
the latter half of the 1970's into the present. Articles on one
aspect or another of the phenomenon frequent the popular
press, and a special edition of Newsweek was recently devoted
to the topic.'
The traditional "Leave It To Beaver" family no longer
prevails in American marriage behavior. To be sure, the
wage-earning husband, the homemaking and child-rearing wife,
and their two joint children-this type of family still exists. But
because divorce rates are high 2 and remarriage abounds,3 many
married couples have or will end life having children from prior
marriages on one or both sides. Families are routinely headed
by two adults working outside the home, or by a single parent.
Unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples, sometimes
with children, are also unmistakable parts of the American
family scene.
And, if you think we live in a multiple-marriage society now,
just wait! Marriage behavior may get even more "multiple" with
the increasing prevalence in the population of those marriages
*Lawrence W. Waggoner is Director of Research, Joint Editorial Board for the
Uniform Probate Code; Reporter, Drafting Committee to Revise Article II of the
Uniform Probate Code; Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School. The author wishes to thank Eleanor B. Alter, Mary Ann Glendon, John
H. Langbein, Malcolm A. Moore, and Patricia J. Roberts for helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this article. The ideas and conclusions expressed herein,
including drafts of proposed legislation, are those of the author and have not been
passed upon by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Copyright (c) 1990 by
Lawrence W. Waggoner.
340 THE RECORD
that are more likely to end in divorce than others-marriages in
which one or both partners were divorced before4 and mar-
riages of couples who cohabited prior to marriage.
5
Inevitably, this transformation has exerted new tensions on
traditional wealth-succession laws, as well as on overlapping
fields such as family law and social security and pension law.
THE UNIFORM LAWS PROJECT
The Uniform Probate Code is about 20 years old and was
developed prior to the multiple-marriage society. Article II of
the Code is undergoing a systematic round of review.6 A main
objective of the project is to develop sensible probate rules for
this changed and still changing climate of marital behavior.
Article II is the part of the Code that deals with the substantive
law of intestacy, wills, and donative transfers.
Free Standing Uniform Act. Once approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), the Article II revisions will also be separated out
and promulgated not only as part of a revised Uniform Probate
Code, but also as a free standing Uniform Act on Intestacy,
Wills, and Donative Transfers, which can be adopted without
the procedural and other provisions of the full Code.
Status of Project. The Uniform Laws project is currently only
in draft form. The Uniform Laws Commissioners have not
given final approval to the results. Some of the provisions were
given a first reading at the 1988 annual NCCUSL meeting. The
project will come up for what is projected to be its final reading
and adoption at the 1990 summer NCCUSL meeting.
I wish to single out four parts of the Uniform Laws project
for discussion in the present paper: the spouse's intestate share;
the spouse's elective (forced) share; the spouse's rights as against
a premarital will; and revocation of benefits to the now-former
spouse in the case of divorce. Of the new provisions, these four
have the greatest impact on the multiple-marriage society.
I shall discuss these parts of the project in terms of a story
HESS LECTURE 341
about a fictional couple-Ben and Elaine. Actually, there are
several different versions of their story that I will be using to
relate the Uniform Laws project to the multiple-marriage
society.
Ben and Elaine got married, their marriage went well, and
they prospered. They bought a house in joint tenancy. They saw
an estate-planning attorney, who set them up with reciprocal
wills and also a revocable inter vivos trust. Ben's employer
provided a retirement plan and Ben, along the way, also bought
a substantial amount of life insurance. All of these documents-
the will, the revocable trust, the retirement plan, and the
life-insurance policy-named Elaine as the sole beneficiary at
Ben's death. Ben's parents having died, and Ben being an only
child, Ben tried to get on the good side of Elaine's parents by
putting them in as the alternate beneficiary.
THE REVOCATION-UPON-DIVORCE PROVISION
As time went on, regrettably, Ben and Elaine started to grow
apart. Ben devoted his time to business and neglected Elaine.
Elaine devoted her time to Carl, an old flame to whom she
almost got married before she met Ben. Well . . . eventually
Ben's and Elaine's difficulties led to divorce. Shortly after the
divorce, Elaine married Carl. And, shortly after Elaine's mar-
riage to Carl-Ben died.
The key to the distribution of Ben's assets focuses on a section
that is quite commonly found in probate codes-the revocation-
upon-divorce section.
Conventional Statutes. If you look at the New York statute7 or
the Uniform Probate Code provision8 on the point, you will find
that these statutes treat the disposition in Ben's will in favor of
Elaine as revoked. You will also find that the statutes do not
extend this treatment to the house held in joint tenancy, nor to
Ben's revocable trust, retirement plan, or life-insurance policy.
You will also find that the effect of revoking the provision for
Elaine in Ben's will is to treat Elaine as having predeceased Ben,
giving effect to the alternative provision in Ben's will in favor of
Elaine's parents.
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Judicial Construction of Conventional Statutes. Due no doubt to
the increased usage of will substitutes, such as revocable trusts,
the courts have come under increasing pressure to use statutory
construction techniques to extend statutes like the New York
and Uniform Probate Code measures to various types of
revocable dispositions---dispositions that are wills in function
and substance, though not in form. 9 As one might expect, the
results of the cases have not been uniform. One of the more
notable of the recent cases is Clymer v. Mayo,10 a 1985 decision
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. The Massachu-
setts court was willing to extend the scope of the statute beyond
its terms; the court held the statute applicable to a revocable
inter vivos trust. But the court was also careful to restrict its
"holding to the particular facts of this case-specifically the
existence of a revocable pour-over trust funded entirely at the
time of the decedent's death."" The testator's will devised the
residue of her estate to the trustee of an unfunded life-
insurance trust she executed on the same day; the life insurance
was employer-paid life insurance. When connected to a pour-
over devise, this type of trust is the easiest to label the same as
a "will," i.e., to say that the statute applies. Some other cases
have reached a similar result,'2 but most cases have not been
willing to extend similar statutory provisions to will substitutes
unconnected to a pour-over devise even though the will
substitute in the case was also the functional equivalent of a
"will," such as a retirement-plan beneficiary designation 13 or
life-insurance beneficiary designation.
14
Proposed New Statute Extends Scope to All Revocable Dispositions.
As drafted, the proposed revocation-upon-divorce section for
the Uniform Laws project is the most comprehensive measure
of its kind. A few states have enacted piecemeal legislation
tending in the same direction.15 The problem in the revocation-
upon-divorce statutes is not that the courts have adopted a
too-narrow construction of them, but that the terms of the
statutes themselves have not expressly covered all the types of
arrangements that are functionally equivalents of wills. In the
proposed Uniform Laws project, we have expanded the terms of
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the statute expressly to cover "will substitutes" (whether or not
connected to a pour-over devise), such as revocable inter vivos
trusts, life-insurance and retirement-plan beneficiary designa-
tions, payable-on-death accounts, and other revocable disposi-
tions made before the divorce (or annulment) by the divorced
individual to his or her former spouse. Unless provided other-
wise, 16 the proposed revocation-upon-divorce statute not only
revokes the provision in Ben's will in favor of Elaine but also in
Ben's retirement plan, 17 life-insurance policy, and revocable
inter vivos trust.
Joint Tenancies Severed Upon Divorce. Elaine will also not be able
to take the joint tenancy property by survivorship. The pro-
posed new section effects a severance of the interests of the
former spouses in property held by them at the time of the
divorce (or annulment) as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship, specifically transforming the form of owner-
ship into a tenancy in common. In effect, this part of the
proposed new statute aligns joint tenancies with tenancies
by the entirety, which are automatically severed upon divorce
of the tenants. Note that the severance of spousal joint tenan-
cies upon divorce is merely an application of the general
principle embraced by the new statute-that all revocable
dispositions are to be presumptively revoked upon divorce. A
joint ten ancy is unilaterally severable by either joint tenant,
meaning that each spouse in effect has a power to revoke
the other's survivorship interest with respect to half the
property.
Revoking Benefits to the Former Spouse's Relatives. If Elaine
doesn't benefit under any of Ben's documents, who does?
Remember that the conventional statutes only revoke bequests
or devises to Elaine; they do so by invoking the fiction that
Elaine predeceased Ben. This would give Ben's property to
Elaine's parents.' 8 Such an outcome does not seem calculated to
have pleased Ben. And so, the new statute also revokes benefits
to the former spouse's relatives as well as to the former spouse.
Under the proposed new statute, Elaine's parents would not be
allowed to take, either.'
9
344 THE RECORD
SPOUSE'S SHARE IN INTESTATE SUCCESSION
Let's turn back the clock, now, and give Ben and Elaine
another chance. Not only did they get married, but they beat
the odds and stayed married. In fact, they had a wonderful
marriage.
But, at some point in the future, the law of mortality-which
even the New York legislature can't repeal-caught up to Ben,
and he died. Elaine survived, along with their two adult children
and a number of grandchildren. We now want to know the
distribution of Ben's estate in intestacy. Ben, it seems, was a
procrastinator, and just never got around to seeing an estate-
planning attorney.
What is, or should be, Elaine's share in intestate succession?
The proposed Uniform Laws project rewards the surviving
spouse in marriages such as Ben's and Elaine's by granting Ben's
entire intestate estate to Elaine. Elaine's share is Ben's entire
intestate estate even though Ben was also survived by their two
joint children. (For shorthand purposes, I will refer to children;
these references should be understood as referring not only to
children, but also to descendants of deceased children.) Elaine
would also be granted the entire intestate estate had they been
childless, since neither of Ben's parents survived.
In all other cases, the surviving spouse's intestate share is a
lump sum plus a fraction of the remaining balance. If the
decedent leaves no surviving children, but a parent, the surviv-
ing spouse's share is the first $200,000 plus three-fourths of the
remaining balance. If all of the decedent's surviving children
are also children of the surviving spouse, but the surviving
spouse has a surviving child who is not a child of the decedent,
the surviving spouse's share is the first $150,000 plus one-half
of the remaining balance. And, if the decedent leaves one or
more surviving children who are not children of the surviving
spouse, the surviving spouse's share is the first $100,000 plus
one-half of the remaining balance.
What this amounts to is that the only times the surviving
spouse's share potentially is less than the full amount of the
intestate estate is if the decedent dies without children but
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survived by a parent; or if the decedent has children and the
decedent or the surviving spouse-either one-has children who
are not children of the other. In the case of Ben and Elaine, no
cut back would occur, since Ben's parents had predeceased him
and his marriage to Elaine was the first marriage for each.
But, we can take the story a little farther into the future.
Suppose that after Ben died intestate survived by Elaine, Elaine
married Carl, who by then was either a widower or a divorc.
Suppose further that some years later, Elaine died intestate
survived by Carl. Because Elaine had children by her marriage
to Ben, Carl would not necessarily take Elaine's entire intestate
estate: Carl's share would be the first $100,000 plus half of the
remaining balance, with the other half of the remaining balance
going to Elaine's children by her marriage to Ben. Had Elaine
and Ben been childless, and had Elaine and Carl had children
by their marriage to each other, Carl's share would depend on
whether he had children by a prior marriage: If he did, Carl's
share would be the first $150,000 plus half of the remaining
balance, with the other half going to Elaine's children; if Carl
had no children by a prior marriage, his intestate share would
be the entire intestate estate (assuming that both of Elaine's
parents predeceased her).
Rationale of Proposed Provision. What is the rationale for this
approach? Let's first consider Elaine's share in Ben's intestate
estate; then we can move to Carl's share in Elaine's intestate
estate.
A mixture of considerations drive, or should drive, the
formulation of intestate-succession laws. The most obvious and
perhaps predominant one is the decedent's intention. Of course,
we give effect to intention by imputation. We impute to Ben the
intention to give all his property to Elaine. We make this
judgment-that the imputation to Ben of such an intention is
justified-on the basis of several items of evidence. One is that
empirical studies show that a strong preference exists within the
populace for granting the entire estate to the surviving spouse,
even when the decedent has surviving children.
20
Another is that the move to give the spouse the entire
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intestate estate is aligned with trends in intestate-succession law
throughout the U.S. and Europe. 2' In her recent book The
Transformation of Family Law (1989), Mary Ann Glendon has
identified this trend, which she calls the "shrinking circle of
heirs" 22 phenomenon. By this she means that, over time,
throughout the U.S. and Europe, "the position of the surviving
spouse has steadily improved everywhere at the expense of the
decedent's blood relatives. '23 She goes on to point out that this
trend "strikingly illustrate[s] the movement of modern marriage
into the foreground of family relationships. 2 4 It recognizes "the
gradual attenuation of legal bonds among family members
outside the conjugal unit of husband, wife, and children" 25 and
"the tendency to view a marriage that lasts until death as a
union of the economic interests of the spouses .... "26
So, in our proposed intestate-succession law, we visualize a
marriage in which neither spouse has children by a prior
marriage as one in which the decedent would have wanted to
give the spouse all of the estate. 27 We also view this attributed
or imputed intention to be quite rational on the decedent's part.
If Ben died prematurely, at a time when their children were still
minors, Elaine would be better equipped to use Ben's property
for the benefit of their children as well as herself. If Ben was
elderly at death, Elaine would also be elderly, and her needs
would be greater than those of their children, who by then
would probably be middle-aged working adults.
Let's switch, now, to the case of Elaine and Carl. In this
marriage, recall that if Elaine had children by Ben (whether or
not she also had children by Carl), Carl's intestate share is the
first $100,000 plus half of the remaining balance; the other half
goes to Elaine's children. Also recall that if Elaine had children
by Carl (but none by Ben), Carl's intestate share is the first
$150,000 plus half of the remaining balance if Carl had children
by a prior marriage; the other half of the remaining balance
goes to Elaine's children.
The rationale for this is that the existence of children by a
prior marriage-on either side-places the surviving spouse in
a moral conflict as to how later to divide the property he or she
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inherited from the decedent: When the surviving spouse later
dies, his or her natural instinct is to treat all of his or her own
children equally; and if the surviving spouse dies intestate, the
intestate-succession law will automatically grant those children
equal shares. To provide the decedent's own children with at least
some protection against the claim of the surviving spouse's other
children, the Uniform Laws project carves off a share, in the
larger intestate estates, for the decedent's own children. The
size of these estates leads one to think that the decedent would
feel that a modest provision for his or her children would not
deprive the surviving spouse of an adequate share. Remember
also that the spouse's intestate share is in addition to any
nonprobate property to which he or she might succeed by
reason of the decedent's death-in the form of joint tenancies
(the home), joint checking, savings, or money-market accounts,
life insurance, pension benefits, and so on.
The proposed Uniform Laws project recognizes that the
surviving spouse's moral conflict is greater when the decedent
has children by a prior marriage than when only the surviving
spouse has children by a prior marriage. The lump sum granted
the surviving spouse in the former case is $100,000; in the latter
case, $150,000.
The approach taken is admittedly a crude solution to the
survivor's moral conflict. If the purpose is to strike a reasonable
balance between the objective of granting the surviving spouse
an adequate share and the objective of assuring that the
surviving spouse does not later deprive the decedent's blood
heirs (the decedent's children) of the unconsumed portion of
the decedent's property, a more responsive solution might be to
reinvoke the idea of common-law dower. When stepchildren are
involved, the idea is attractive of giving the surviving spouse the
use of the property for life, but forcing a return of the
unconsumed portion of that property on the surviving spouse's
death to the decedent's own children. Strictly speaking, no one
would suggest reinvoking true common-law dower, under which
the surviving spouse was entitled to a life estate in one-third of
the decedent's land. Instead, the device would be to create a
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statutory trust of all the decedent's property (land and person-
alty), under which the surviving spouse would receive the right
to all the income generated by the trust for life, coupled with
a power in the statutory trustee to invade the corpus of the trust
to the extent the surviving spouse's other sources of income
prove inadequate for his or her support and maintenance; upon
the survivor's death, any remaining income and corpus would
go to the decedent's own children and not stepchildren (unless,
of course, the decedent had adopted the stepchildren, in which
case they would be treated as his or her own children).
The statutory-trust approach responds to another trouble-
some feature of conventional intestate-succession law. As the
statutes are currently constituted, the decision as to how much
to award the surviving spouse must be made on the basis of the
facts existing at the decedent's death. This does not permit
account to be taken of the possibility that a surviving spouse
who had no children by a prior marriage at the decedent's death
might subsequently remarry and have children by the new
spouse. Conventional intestate-succession schemes provide no
mechanism for adjustment in cases where a surviving spouse's
moral conflict arises after the decedent's death. The statutory-
trust approach, on the other hand, if applied in all intestacy
cases with a surviving spouse, and not just in cases in which the
moral conflict is known to exist at the decedent's death, provides
a solution to this problem.
The statutory-trust approach, therefore, has a lot to com-
mend it, except for one thing: It makes little practical sense! It's
simply not practical to compel a statutory trust in every intestate
case with a surviving spouse, with respect to mainly small estates
of, say, $15,000 to $25,000.28 In the end, the statutory-trust
approach was not adopted.
REDESIGNED ELECTIVE SHARE
As we've just seen, intestate-succession law visualizes a mar-
riage in which the decedent would have wanted to give the
spouse all of the estate; or, if there are no children but a parent
or children by a prior marriage, a substantial portion of the
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estate. We impute to Ben the desire to give all his property to
Elaine; we impute to Elaine a desire to give her property to
Carl, except that we also impute to her a desire to give some of
her property to her children by her marriage to Ben if she has
enough property to afford to do that. If there is extrinsic
evidence to the contrary, we don't want to hear it; in fact, if
there is corroborating evidence, we don't want to bother with
that, either.
Ordinarily, the only type of contrary evidence we recognize is
documentary evidence-a valid will expressing an intent to give
the spouse less or nothing at all. In intestate-succession cases, by
definition we have no such evidence.
I now turn to the situation where we do have such evidence.
I now address the situation where the decedent has left a will
totally (or largely) disinheriting the surviving spouse.
29
The Partnership Theory of Marriage
Disinheritance of a surviving spouse brings into question the
fundamental nature of the economic rights of each spouse in a
marital relationship, of how the institution of marriage is viewed
in society. The contemporary view of marriage is that it is an
economic partnership. The partnership theory of marriage,
sometimes also called the marital-sharing theory, is stated in
various ways. Sometimes it is thought of "as an expression of the
presumed intent of husbands and wives to pool their fortunes
on an equal basis, share and share alike."'30 Under this ap-
proach, the economic rights of each spouse are seen as deriving
from an unspoken marital bargain under which the partners
agree that each is to enjoy a half interest in the fruits of the
marriage, i.e., in the property nominally acquired by and titled
in the sole name of either partner during the marriage (other
than in property acquired by gift or inheritance). A decedent
who disinherits his or her surviving spouse is seen as having
reneged on the bargain. Sometimes the theory is expressed in
restitutionary terms, a return-of-contribution notion. Under this
approach, the law grants each spouse an entitlement to compen-
sation for non-monetary contributions to the marital enterprise,
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as "a recognition of the activity of one spouse in the home and
to compensate not only for this activity but for opportunities
lost." 3 1
No matter how the rationale is expressed, the community-
property system 32 recognizes the partnership theory, but it is
sometimes thought that the common-law system denies it. In the
ongoing marriage, it is true that the basic principle in the
common-law (title-based) states is that marital status does not
affect the ownership of property. The regime is one of separate
property. Each spouse owns all that he or she earns. By contrast,
in the community-property states, each spouse acquires an
ownership interest in half the property the other earns during
the marriage. By granting each spouse upon acquisition an
immediate half interest in the earnings of the other, the
community-property regimes directly recognize that the cou-
ple's enterprise is in essence collaborative.
The common-law states, however, also give effect or purport
to give effect to the partnership theory when it counts most-at
dissolution of a marriage upon divorce. If the marriage ends in
divorce, a spouse who sacrificed his or her financial-earning
opportunities to contribute so-called domestic services to the
marital enterprise (such as child-rearing and homemaking) or a
spouse who pursued a lower-paying career or who engaged in
volunteer work stands to be recompensed. Almost all, if not all,
states now follow the so-called equitable-distribution system
upon divorce,33 under which "broad discretion [is given to] trial
courts to assign to either spouse property acquired during the
marriage, irrespective of title, taking into account the circum-
stances of the particular case and recognizing the value of the
contributions of a nonworking spouse or homemaker to the
acquisition of that property. Simply stated, the system of
equitable distribution views marriage as essentially a shared
enterprise or joint undertaking in the nature of a partnership
to which both spouses contribute-directly and indirectly, finan-
cially and nonfinancially-the fruits of which are distributable at
divorce." 34
The other situation in which spousal property rights figure
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prominently is the topic at hand--disinheritance at death.
Almost all common-law states have decided that this is one of
the few instances in American law where the decedent's testa-
mentary freedom with respect to his or her title-based owner-
ship interests must be curtailed. No matter what the decedent's
intent, the common-law states recognize that the surviving
spouse does have some claim to a portion of the decedent's
estate. These statutes provide the spouse a so-called forced
share. The forced share is expressed as an option that the
survivor can elect or let lapse during the administration of the
decedent's estate, hence the forced share is sometimes termed
the "elective" share. Forced-share law in the common-law states,
however, has not caught up to the partnership theory of
marriage. Under typical American forced-share law, including
the forced share provided by the original Uniform Probate
Code and, if the decedent is survived by one or more issue, the
one provided by the New York statute,35 a surviving spouse may
claim a one-third share of the decedent's estate-not the fifty
percent share of the couple's combined assets that the partner-
ship theory would imply. The redesigned elective share is
intended to bring forced-share law into line with the partner-
ship theory of marriage.
To illustrate the discrepancy between the partnership theory
and conventional forced-share law, consider first a long-term
marriage, in which the couple's combined assets were accumu-
lated mostly during the course of the marriage. The current
forced-share fraction of one-third of the decedent's estate
plainly does not implement a partnership principle. The actual
result is at the mercy of which spouse happens to die first and
of how the property accumulated during the marriage was
nominally titled.
Consider Ben and Elaine again: Assume that Ben and
Elaine were married in their twenties or early thirties;
they never divorced, and Ben died somewhat prema-
turely at age, say, 62, survived by Elaine. For whatever
reason, Ben left a will entirely disinheriting Elaine.
Throughout their long life together, the couple man-
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aged to accumulate assets worth $600,000, marking
them as a somewhat affluent but hardly wealthy couple.
Under conventional forced-share law, Elaine's ultimate
entitlement is entirely at the mercy of the manner in which
these $600,000 in assets were nominally titled as be-
tween them. Elaine could end up much poorer or much
richer than a fifty/fifty principle would suggest. The
reason is that under conventional forced-share law,
Elaine has a claim to one-third of Ben's "estate".
When the marital assets have been disproportionately
titled in the decedent's name, conventional forced-share
law often entitles the survivor to less than an equal
share. Thus, if Ben "owned" all $600,000 of the marital
assets, Elaine's claim against Ben's estate would only be
for $200,000-well below Elaine's $300,000 entitlement
produced by the partnership/marital-sharing principle.
And, if Ben "owned" $500,000 of the marital assets,
Elaine's claim against Ben's estate would only be for
$166,500 (one third of $500,000), which when combined
with Elaine's "own" $100,000 yields a less than equal
share of $266,500 for Elaine-still below the $300,000
figure produced by the partnership/marital-sharing
principle.
When, on the other hand, the marital assets have
already been more or less equally divided, conventional
forced-share law grants the survivor a right to take a
disproportionately large share. If Ben and Elaine each
owned $300,000, Elaine is still granted a claim against
Ben's estate for an additional $100,000.
Finally, when the marital assets have been dispropor-
tionately titled in the survivor's name, conventional
forced-share law entitles the survivor to magnify the
disproportion. If only $200,000 were titled in Ben's
name, Elaine would still have a claim against Ben's estate
for $66,667 (one third of $200,000), even though Elaine
was already overcompensated as judged by the partner-
ship/marital-sharing theory.
I should now like to draw attention to a very different sort of
marriage-a short-term marriage, particularly the short-term
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marriage later in life, where each spouse typically comes into the
marriage with assets derived from a former marriage. In these
marriages, the one-third fraction of the decedent's estate far
exceeds a fifty/fifty division of assets acquired during the
marriage.
To illustrate this sort of marriage, let's return to the case of
Elaine and Carl. Remember that a few years after Ben's death,
Elaine married Carl. Suppose that both Elaine and Carl were in
their mid-to-later sixties when they were married. Then sup-
pose that after a few years of marriage-five, let's say-, Elaine
died survived by Carl. Assume further that both Elaine and Carl
have adult children and a few grandchildren by their prior
marriages, and that each naturally would prefer to leave most
or all of his or her property to those children. So, let's work
through the numbers:
The value of the couple's combined assets is, again,
$600,000, $300,000 of which is titled in Elaine's name
(the decedent) and $300,000 of which is titled in Carl's
name (the survivor).
Under conventional forced-share law, Carl would
have a claim to one-third of Elaine's estate, or $100,000.
Keep in mind that when this short-term, late-in-life
marriage terminated by Elaine's death, Elaine's assets
were $300,000 and Carl's assets were $300,000. For
reasons that are not immediately apparent, conventional
forced-share law gives the survivor, Carl, a right to
shrink Elaine's estate (and hence the share of Elaine's
children by her prior marriage to Ben) by $100,000
(reducing it to $200,000) while supplementing Carl's
assets (which will likely go to Carl's children by his prior
marriage) by $100,000 (increasing their value to
$400,000).
Conventional forced-share law, in other words, basically
rewards the children of the remarried spouse who manages to
outlive the other, arranging for those children a windfall share
of one third of the "loser's" estate. The "winning" spouse who
chanced to survive gains a windfall, for this "winner" is unlikely
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to have made a contribution, monetary or otherwise, to the
"loser's" wealth remotely worth one-third.
How prevalent are marriages like that between Elaine and
Carl-the remarriage later in life ending in the death of one of
the partners a few years later? Plainly, such marriages do not
affect a high proportion of the widowed and divorced popula-
tion. Nevertheless, government data suggest that the incidence
of such marriages may not be insignificant.3 6 Equally to the
point, when such marriages occur, conventional forced-share
law renders results that are dramatically inconsistent with the
partnership theory of marriage. That these results are seen as
unjust by the children of the decedent's former marriage is both
unsurprising and well documented in the forced-share case
law.
3 7
Recognize, then, that in a case like that of Elaine and
Carl-the short-term, late-in-life marriage, which produces no
children-, a decedent who disinherits or largely disinherits the
surviving spouse may not be acting so much from malice or
spite toward the surviving spouse, but from a felt higher
obligation to the children of his or her former, long-term
marriage.
Specific Features of
the Redesigned Elective Share
The redesigned elective-share system incorporated in the
proposed Uniform Laws project responds to these concerns by
bringing forced-share law into line with the partnership theory
of marriage.
In the long-term marriage, illustrated by the marriage of Ben
and Elaine, the effect of implementing a partnership theory is
to increase the entitlement of the surviving spouse when the
marital assets were disproportionately titled in the decedent's
name; and to decrease or even eliminate the entitlement of the
surviving spouse when the marital assets were more or less
equally titled or disproportionately titled in the surviving
spouse's name. The effect is both to reward the surviving spouse
who sacrificed his or her financial-earning opportunities in
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order to contribute so-called domestic services to the marital
enterprise and to deny an additional windfall to the surviving
spouse in whose name the fruits of a long-term marriage were
mostly titled.
In the short-term, later-in-life marriage illustrated by the
marriage of Elaine and Carl, the effect of implementing a
partnership theory is to decrease or even eliminate the windfall
entitlement of the spouse who chanced to survive, for in such
a marriage, neither spouse is likely to have contributed much,
if anything, to the acquisition of the other's wealth. The effect
is to deny a windfall to the survivor who contributed little to the
decedent's wealth, and ultimately to deny a windfall to the
survivor's children by a prior marriage at the expense of the
decedent's children by a prior marriage. Bear in mind that in
such a marriage, which produces no children, a decedent who
disinherits or largely disinherits the surviving spouse may not be
acting so much from malice or spite toward the surviving
spouse, but from a natural instinct to want to leave most or all
of his or her property to the children of his or her former,
long-term marriage. In hardship cases, however, as explained
later, a special supplemental elective-share amount is provided
when the surviving spouse would otherwise be left without
sufficient funds for support.
Implementation of The Partnership/Marital-Sharing Theory. Be-
cause ease of administration and predictability of result are
prized features of the probate system, implementing the part-
nership or marital-sharing theory proved to be a challenging
undertaking. In the judgment of the drafters, neither model
provided by existing law-the equitable-distribution system
provided by divorce law or the community-property system
allocating ownership of marital property equally between the
spouses-seemed appropriate as a basis for adapting forced-
share law to noncommunity property states.
An Equitable-Distribution Forced Share? Modeling the elective
share on divorce law appeared to us to be quite unsatisfactory.
The strongest argument for extending divorce law to disinheri-
tance at death is that of parallelism. Disinheritance of a spouse
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at death resembles divorce, the argument goes, because the
marriage has failed and terminated. 38 There are several objec-
tions to this analogy. One is that disinheritance at death-
especially in the late-in-life marriage-need not be the mark of
a failed marriage. Disinheritance of such a spouse might be
motivated by the decedent's sense that he or she had a higher
obligation to his or her children by a prior marriage, especially
if the disinherited spouse has ample independent means of
support. Conventional law, of course, allows such a surviving
spouse to take a forced share of the decedent's estate anyway,
or to be prevailed upon by his or her children by a prior
marriage to do so.
Nor is the goal of parity between regimes of marital property
division on divorce and death compatible with a Uniform Laws
project devoted to achieving uniformity within the probate
system. Although all or almost all states now follow the so-called
equitable-distribution system upon divorce, there is considerable
variation among the states in the details, large and small, of
implementing that system. There is not one, uniformly accepted
equitable-distribution system; there are several.39 The systems
vary with respect to the type of property that is subject to
equitable distribution and they take into account different
factors in deciding how to divide that property. Professor
Oldham has identified three major types of equitable-
distribution systems: 40 (1) the "kitchen sink" system, in which all
property of the two spouses, regardless of how or when
acquired, is subject to division; 41 (2) the "marital property"
system, which excludes "separate" or "individual" property-
excludes, that is, property acquired by either spouse before the
marriage and property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage by gift or inheritance; and (3) the "hybrid" system, in
which separate or individual property is presumptively excluded
from division, but could be reached when exclusion would be
"unfair." Further variations within each broad category are
recognized.
If parity with the regime of marital property both in divorce
and in dissolution on death is the goal, a Uniform Laws project
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that aspires to a single regime for dissolution on death cannot
track the multiplicity of regimes on divorce. The logic of the
argument for parity is that within each state the method of
property division upon divorce and upon disinheritance at
death should be the same. The logic of a Uniform Laws project
dealing with probate law is that each state should honor the
same elective-share system, particularly in order to prevent a
spouse bent on disinheritance from domicile shopping by
moving property to a state with fewer safeguards against this
sort of behavior.
Quite apart from concerns about the difficulty of implement-
ing parity between forced-share law and equitable-distribution
law, the discretionary aspect of equitable-distribution law makes
it inappropriate for a forced-share system. Under equitable
distribution, once the property subject to division is identified,
the practice is not to divide that property by applying a flat
fraction, fifty/fifty or whatever, but to weigh various factors in
determining how that property is to be divided, often (but not
always) including "misconduct" or "fault" of each party-such as
adultery, violence, excessive drinking, sexual neglect, mental
cruelty4 2-and other subjective criteria. 43 When death termi-
nates the marriage, only the surviving spouse can testify as
to certain types or instances of misconduct or fault, making
factors such as these seem unfair to the decedent's side. In
addition, whether or not the state's laundry list of factors
includes fault or misconduct, the exact weight to be given each
included factor is not prescribed. Because each case is handled
on an ad hoc basis,44 equitable distribution is in truth "discre-
tionary distribution.
'45
Consequently, we endorse the analysis of Professors Kwestel
and Seplowitz, who recently wrote:
[A]n equitable distribution model, which entails a case-
by-case determination based upon [ I subjective criteria,
is not appropriate in the elective share area, which has
traditionally involved different concerns and in which
predictability and ease of administration are important
goals. Furthermore, use of an equitable distribution
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model would significantly impede the development of a
comprehensive estate plan and, more importantly,
would probably provide no greater protection for the
surviving spouse .... 46
A Deferred Community-Property Forced Share? The other model
from existing law that might implement a partnership or
marital-sharing theory is the community-property system. As
noted before, under community-property law, each spouse
automatically acquires a half interest in property as it is acquired
during the marriage (other than by gift or inheritance). There
are two possible approaches for injecting community law into
the legislative scheme of the noncommunity property states on
a deferred-until-death basis, and it is not always clear which of
the two approaches is advocated by those proposing it.47 One
approach, called the strict deferred-community approach, auto-
matically retitles the couple's property upon the decedent's
death, giving both the surviving spouse and the decedent
spouse's estate an automatic half interest in that portion of the
couple's property (however titled during the course of the
marriage) that would have been community property had they
lived their married life in a community-property jurisdiction.
48
The other approach, called the forced-share deferred-community
approach, gives the surviving spouse (but not the decedent
spouse's estate) a right to elect that same portion of the couple's
property.
4 9
The forced-share deferred-community approach. 50 is consid-
erably more promising as a model for implementing the
partnership/marital-sharing theory than equitable-distribution
law. Interestingly, most of the community-property states them-
selves recognize a difference between termination of a marriage
by divorce and termination by death of one of the spouses: The
discretionary equitable-distribution system is used for divorce,
5 1
but the mechanical community-property fifty/fifty split is used
at death. In the probate area, the attractive feature of commu-
nity law is its predetermined formula. That portion of the
couple's property acquired during the marriage (other than by
gift or inheritance) is divided according to a strict fifty/fifty
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ratio; other factors are excluded. In terms of the contribution
theory, the premise upon which community law can be said to
rest is that of an irrebuttable presumption that each spouse
contributed equally to the acquisition of the couple's wealth.52
The argument for a mechanical as opposed to a discretionary
formula for determining contribution was recently stated in
these terms:
[Forced-share] law could, in theory, open [the question
of contribution] to examination of the merits in each
case, but it has not, and for good reason. The proofs
would be extraordinarily difficult. The issues in such a
case would not resemble the issues in ordinary fact-
finding-issues such as whether the traffic light was
green or red. Examining the true merits of the case
under a forced-share system that tried to establish the
spouses's actual contributions to the family wealth would
necessarily entail an inquiry into virtually every facet of
the spouses's conduct throughout the marriage. Further,
that litigation would arise just when death has sealed the
lips of the most affected party. These are the concerns
that have in the past led American policymakers to
prefer a mechanical forced-share system over [a discre-
tionary] system.
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Unlike the equitable-distribution model, the fact that the
community-property systems vary from state to state with
respect to details such as whether income earned during the
marriage on separate property becomes community property or
remains separate does not pose a problem. A forced share based
on a deferred-until-death community-property model is not
proposed for the community-property states; lack of parity is
therefore not a disadvantage. A deferred community-property
forced share is for noncommunity property states. Conse-
quently, the variations in the details of community law that exist
within the community-property states could easily be resolved
by embracing one method on each of the subsidiary issues upon
which there is variation. 54
If lack of parity is not a problem, why then did we not adopt
a deferred-community forced share? The perceived difficulty is
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the tracing-to-source and associated problems. 55 A deferred-
community forced share would require identifying which of the
couple's assets were acquired during the marriage (other than
by gift or inheritance) and which were brought into the
marriage (or acquired during the marriage by gift or inheri-
tance). This problem is arguably more difficult in noncommu-
nity-property states than in community-property states because
couples in the former are not put on notice of the risk of not
keeping good records. The problem is commingling. 56 To be
sure, the administrative burden could be eased by adopting a
presumption that all spousal property is community property.
That presumption would ease the administrative burden, but at
the cost of reaching incorrect results in cases in which the
presumption would prevail not because it is correct but because
sufficient contrary evidence cannot be obtained. 57 Thus, what
appears to be an exact method may not in fact give exact results.
The Method Adopted-An Accrual-Type Forced Share System. To
avoid the tracing-to-source problem, we decided to implement
the marital-partnership theory by means of a mechanically
determined approximation system, which we call an accrual-
type forced share. Under the accrual-type forced share, there
is no need to identify which of the couple's property was
earned during the marriage and which was acquired prior to
the marriage or acquired during the marriage by gift or
inheritance.
The accrual-type forced share has three essential features.
The first establishes a schedule under which the elective share
adjusts to the length of the marriage. The longer the marriage,
the bigger the "elective-share percentage." The sliding scale
adjusts for the correspondingly greater contribution to the
acquisition of the couple's marital property in a marriage of
fifteen years than in a marriage of fifteen days. Specifically, the
"elective-share percentage" starts low and increases annually
according to a graduated schedule until it levels off at fifty
percent. The exact schedule starts by providing the surviving
spouse, during the first year of marriage, a right to elect the
"supplemental elective-share amount"5 8 only. After one year of
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marriage, the surviving spouse's "elective-share percentage" is
three percent of the augmented estate and it increases with each
additional year of marriage until it reaches the maximum fifty
percent level after fifteen years of marriage.
59
The second feature of the redesigned system is that the
"elective-share percentage" is applied to the value of the
couple's combined assets, 60 not merely to the value of the assets
nominally titled in the decedent's name. This calculation yields
the "elective-share amount"-the amount to which the surviving
spouse is entitled. Application of the "elective-share percentage"
to the couple's combined assets is an absolutely essential feature,
if the system is to implement a marital-sharing theory. If the
elective-share percentage were to be applied only to the dece-
dent's assets, a surviving spouse who has already been overcom-
pensated in terms of the way the couple's marital assets have
been nominally titled would receive a further windfall under the
elective-share system. The couple's marital assets, in other
words, would not be equalized. By applying the elective-share
percentage to the couple's combined assets, the redesigned
elective-share system denies any significance to the wholly
fortuitous factor of how the spouses happened to have taken
title to particular assets.
The third feature is that the surviving spouse's own assets are
counted first (or a portion of them in under-fifteen-year
marriages, as explained below) in making up the spouse's
ultimate entitlement, so that the decedent's assets are liable only
to make up the deficiency, if any.
Let's illustrate these three features, first in the case of Ben
and Elaine and then in the case of Elaine and Carl. Here's how
it works with Ben and Elaine:
Remember that Ben and Elaine were married a long
time (well beyond the fifteen-year mark) and that Ben
died at age 70, survived by Elaine. Also remember that,
for whatever reason, Ben left a will entirely disinheriting
Elaine. 61 And, remember that the value of the couple's
combined assets was $600,000.62
Under the redesigned elective share, the survivor's
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entitlement in a marriage of this length would have
reached the 50 percent mark long before Ben's death.
Unlike previous forced-share statutes, the redesigned
elective share disregards how these combined assets
were nominally titled as between Ben and Elaine. For
purposes of the redesigned elective share, the assets are
not regarded as partly belonging to Ben and partly to
Elaine. Under the marital-sharing theory of the rede-
signed system, half the value of those assets-
$300,000-"belongs" to the surviving spouse, Elaine (if
Elaine wishes to claim that amount by making an
election).
Of course, in working out the amount of Elaine's claim
on Ben's estate, it does matter how the $600,000 in assets
was nominally titled as between them.
When the marital assets were disproportionately titled
in the decedent's name, the redesigned elective-share
system gives the survivor a right to equalize them. If Ben
"owned" all $600,000, and Elaine "owned" nothing,
Elaine's claim against Ben's estate would be for
$300,000. If Ben "owned" $500,000 of the marital
assets, and Elaine "owned" $100,000 of them, Elaine's
claim against Ben's estate would be for $200,000, which
is the amount necessary to bring Elaine's $100,000 in
assets up to the $300,000 level.
When the marital assets were already more or less
equally divided, the redesigned elective-share system
prevents the survivor from taking a disproportionately
large share. Thus, if $300,000 of the marital assets were
titled in Ben's name, and $300,000 were titled in Elaine's
name, Elaine would have no claim against Ben's estate,
for Elaine's title-based ownership rights would already
have sufficiently rewarded her, as judged by the part-
nership/marital-sharing theory.
When the marital assets were disproportionately titled
in the survivor's name, the redesigned elective-share
system prevents the survivor from magnifying the dis-
proportion. If Ben "owned" $200,000, and Elaine
"owned" $400,000, Elaine would have no claim against
Ben's estate for an additional amount.
63
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. Now, let's turn to Elaine and Carl. Remember that, a few
years after Ben's death, Elaine married Carl. Both Elaine and
Carl were in their mid-to-late sixties, and after a few years of
marriage-about five, we said-Elaine died survived by Carl.
Both Elaine and Carl had adult children and a few grandchil-
dren) by their prior marriages.
The previous discussion of this example showed how the
conventional-type forced-share law gives the one who survives
the other the power to siphon off (for the survivor's children,
eventually) a share of the loser's estate without justification
under the marital-sharing principle.
Let's, now, see how Carl (and ultimately his children by his
prior marriage) fares under the redesigned system:
Recall that the value of the couple's combined assets was
$600,000, of which $300,000 was titled in Elaine's name
(the decedent) .and $300,000 was titled in Carl's name
(the survivor). This having been a marriage that lasted
about five years, the elective-share percentage is 15
percent.
Although Carl's elective-share entitlement is $90,000
(15 percent of $600,000), this does not mean that Carl
has a $90,000 claim against Elaine's estate. Thirty
percent of Carl's own $300,000 in assets (double the
elective-share percentage of fifteen percent) count in
fulfillment of Carl's elective-share amount.64 Since thirty
percent of Carl's assets is $90,000, there is no deficiency,
and hence no claim to any of Elaine's assets. And, there
should properly be none.
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The Support Theory
The partnership/marital-sharing theory is not the only driving
force behind forced-share law. Another theoretical basis for
forced-share law is that the spouses' mutual duties of support
during their joint lifetimes should be continued in some form
after death in favor of the survivor, as a claim on the decedent's
estate. Current forced-share law implements this theory poorly.
The fixed fraction, whether it is the typical one-third or some
other fraction, disregards the survivor's actual need. A one-
364 THE RECORD
third share may be inadequate to the surviving spouse's needs,
especially in a modest estate. On the other hand, in a very large
estate, it may go far beyond the survivor's needs. In either a
modest or a large estate, the survivor may or may not have
ample independent means, and this factor, too, is disregarded
in conventional forced-share law.
The redesigned elective-share system in the proposed Uni-
form Laws project seeks to implement the support theory by
granting the survivor a supplemental elective-share amount
related to the survivor's actual needs. In implementing a
support rationale, the length of the marriage is quite irrelevant.
Because the duty of support is founded upon status, it arises at
the time of the marriage.
We implement the support theory by providing a supplemen-
tal elective-share amount of $50,000.66 Counted first in making
up this $50,000 amount are the surviving spouse's own titled-
based ownership interests, including amounts shifting to the
survivor at the decedent's death and amounts owing to the
survivor from the decedent's estate under the accrual-type
elective-share apparatus discussed above, but excluding
amounts going to the survivor under the Code's probate
exemptions and allowances and the survivor's Social Security
and other governmental benefits. If the survivor's assets are less
than the $50,000 minimum, then the survivor is entitled to
whatever additional portion of the decedent's estate is neces-
sary, up to 100 percent of it, to bring the survivor's assets up to
that minimum level. In the case of a late marriage, in which the
survivor is perhaps aged in the mid-seventies, the minimum
figure plus the probate exemptions and allowances (which
under the Code amount to a minimum of another $43,000) is
pretty much on target-in conjunction with Social Security
payments, which in 1990 could range somewhere between $600
and $975 a month, and other governmental benefits-to pro-
vide the survivor with a fairly adequate means of support.
67
In short, no matter how brief or extended, happy or unhappy
the marriage was, a decedent with ample means should not be
able to leave the survivor impoverished, and the minimum
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elective-share feature of the redesigned system seeks to prevent
him or her from doing so.
Augmented-Estate Concept
I don't want to leave the elective share without mentioning
another aspect of the overall problem. This is the problem of
"fraud on the spouse's share." It arises when the decedent seeks
to evade the spouse's elective share by engaging in various kinds
of nominal inter vivos transfers. To render that type of behavior
ineffective, the original Uniform Probate Code of 1969 picked
up New York's and Pennsylvania's augmented-estate concept,
which extended the forced-share entitlement (via the aug-
mented-estate concept) to property that was the subject of
specified types of inter vivos transfer, such as revocable inter vivos
trusts.
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In the redesign of the elective share, we have strengthened
the augmented-estate concept. Students of the 1969 Code (and
of the New York provision) will know that several loopholes
were left ajar in the augmented estate-a notable one being life
insurance the decedent buys, naming someone other than his or
her surviving spouse as the beneficiary. With appropriate
protection for the insurance company that pays off before
receiving notice of an elective-share claim, the redesigned
elective-share closes that loophole, as well as the others.
SPOUSE'S PROTECTION IN THE CASE
OF A PREMARITAL WILL
The elective-share apparatus is not the only protection the
Uniform Probate Code provides a disinherited surviving spouse.
There is another provision that might come into play, a
provision unique to the Uniform Probate Code. This is the
omitted-spouse provision; its purpose is to protect the surviving
spouse against unintentional disinheritance.
Nearly all states have a similar type of statute for children,
called a "pretermitted-heir" statute. These statutes typically
grant children born after the execution of the will a measure of
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protection from being unintentionally disinherited, and the
UPC has such a provision also.
Although pretermitted-heir statutes are common, protection
for the decedent's surviving spouse against the provisions of a
premarital will is rare---outside the UPC states. 69 The Code's
omitted-spouse provision stands in addition to the apparatus of
the elective share. The purpose is partly to reduce the fre-
quency of elections under the elective share, and thus to reduce
the number of times the augmented-estate procedure is in-
voked. Another purpose is to provide a share for the surviving
spouse more related to the amount the decedent would proba-
bly have wanted to give, had he or she gotten around to revising
the premarital will.
Under the omitted-spouse provision of the 1969 Code, a
surviving spouse who was disinherited by a premarital will was
given a right to his or her intestate share. The provision is
meant to be intent-effectuating, not intent-defeating. Thus,
unlike the elective-share provisions, the omitted-spouse provi-
sion yields to a contrary intention stated by the decedent in the
premarital will or inferred from circumstances, such as if the
will was made in contemplation of the marriage.
When this provision was first drafted and brought into the
Code, the setting in which it probably was principally thought
to operate was with respect to a first marriage. With the
remarriage phenomenon on the increase, whether the remar-
riage follows divorce or death of the first spouse, and with the
revisions having dramatically increased the intestate share of the
surviving spouse, we thought that added attention should be
paid to the omitted-spouse provision.
A particular concern was the impact of this provision on the
last example we discussed in the elective share. Remember that
in that example, we began with Ben and Elaine having lived a
long married life to one another, a marriage that produced
children. Then, after Ben died, Elaine married Carl.
It would not be exceptional if, during their marriage, Ben
and Elaine had executed mutual wills, in which each devised the
entire estate to the other if the other survives, but if not, to their
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children. Were this to have been the situation when Ben died,
Elaine would have succeeded to Ben's entire estate; Elaine
would have had no reason to have claimed an elective share. It
would also not be exceptional if, after Ben's death, Elaine never
undertook to execute another will, not even after marrying
Carl. She could hardly be expected to appreciate the need to do
so, considering the fact that her new will would merely repeat
the provisions in her old will for her children.
So, this is the type of late-in-life marriage where Elaine's
instincts would likely be to want to continue to provide for her
children by her first marriage, to Ben. This is also the type of
late-in-life marriage that the redesigned elective share ends up
granting Carl no claim or a very modest claim against Elaine's
estate. If, however, Carl could use the omitted-spouse provision
instead of the elective-share apparatus and take a much bigger
portion, the whole purpose of having redesigned the elective
share could be defeated. And, unless Elaine and Carl had
entered into a premarital agreement, Carl would be able to do
this under the omitted-spouse provision of the 1969 Code.
The revisions solve this problem. The solution we adopted is
to amend the omitted-spouse provision so that the spouse (Carl
in our example) who is omitted from a premarital will is entitled
to an intestate share only in that portion of the decedent's estate
neither devised to the decedent's children by a prior marriage
nor to their descendants.70 In our example, then, Carl would
have nothing coming under the omitted-spouse provision, and
would be remitted to the marital-sharing principle implemented
by the redesigned elective-share apparatus.
The omitted-spouse provision can still play a useful role,
however. In the case of a first marriage, where occasionally the
decedent spouse may have executed a premarital will in favor
of his or her parents or siblings, the omitted spouse is entitled
under the omitted-spouse provision to the full intestate share.
And, the provision is certainly not restricted to first marriages,
but applies to any marriage. To the extent that any premarital
will favors persons other than children (or descendants) of a
prior marriage, the surviving spouse is entitled to a full intestate
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share. That share might very well be the entire estate and-in
consequence-quite properly give the spouse much more than
he or she would take under the elective-share apparatus.
CONCLUSION
The multiple-marriage society seems to be here to stay, and
the probate laws must respond intelligently to it. The conven-
tional probate laws now in place, including those in the original
Uniform Probate Code, do not fit that society as well as they
might. We believe that the package of statutory provisions
discussed in this article move in the right direction. To be sure,
as in any uniform laws project, the final package reflects a
multitude of policy choices on which reasonable minds can
differ, on which a reasonable case could be made for making a
different choice. Thus we do not assert that our package
contains the "right" answers and that any other set of answers
is "wrong." We do believe that ours is a reasonable package, that
it is well thought out, and that its individual parts add up to a
coherent whole. As such, we believe it is suitable response to the
multiple-marriage society and hope that it will be given serious
consideration in all states.
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rights as the designated beneficiary."); American Health & Life Ins. v. Binford, 511
So.2d 1250 (La. Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he description in the policy of Ms. Watson as
wife is merely the showing of a relationship in existence at the time of the execution
of the contract. The termination of the relationship has no automatic effect on the
provisions of the insurance policy."); Gerhard v. Travelers Ins. Co., 107 N.J. Super.
414, 258 A.2d 724 (1969) ("[A] separation agreement... which contain[s] a general
release of all claims to each other's estate [does] not divest the [former] wife of her
interest, as named beneficiary, since her claim under the policy was neither against
him nor his estate, but was against the insurance company."); Romero v. Melendez, 83
N.M. 776, 498 P2d 305 (1972) ("The weight of competent authority seems to
support the proposition that where the divorce decree makes a definite disposition
of the insurance policies, the [former] wife's interest as a beneficiary can be defeated
by such disposition .... [Clases holding conversely do so on the basis of the absence
of a clear divorce decree."); Cannon v. Hamilton, 174 Ohio St. 268, 189 N.E.2d 152
(1963) ("[W]here the terms of a separation agreement carried into a divorce decree
plainly disclose an intent to remove the [former spouse] from all rights to the
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proceeds thereof, such agreement may . . . prevent the [former spouse] from
claiming the proceeds ..., but the separation agreement herein did not contain
language sufficiently strong or definite to accomplish that result, especially when
considered in relation to [the insured's failure] to change the beneficiary in
accordance with the terms of the policy [during the 11-year period between the
divorce and his death]."); Lewis v. Lewis, 693 S.W. 2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1985);
Bersch v. Van Kleeck, 112 Wis. 2d 594, 334 N.W. 2d 114 (1983); but cf. Stiles v. Stiles,
21 Mass. App. Ct. 514, 487 N.E. 2d 874 (1986).
10 393 Mass. 754, 473 N.E.2d 1084 (1985).
11 473 N.E.2d at 1093.
12 E.g., Miller v. First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 637 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1981). In this case,
the court held a similar statute applicable to an unfunded life-insurance trust. The
testator's will devised the residue of his estate to the trustee of the life-insurance
trust. The court held that the pour-over devise incorporated the life-insurance trust
into the will by reference, and for this reason the revocation statute was held
applicable.
13 E.g., Pepper v. Peacher, 742 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1987); Estate of Adams, 447 Pa. 177,
288 A.2d 514 (1972).
14 E.g., Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Stitzel, 1 Pa. Fiduc.2d 316 (C.P. 1981).
15 As yet, no state has enacted a provision as comprehensive as the one drafted
in the Uniform Laws project. Michigan and Ohio have statutes transforming spousal
joint tenancies in land into tenancies in common upon the spouses' divorce. Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.102; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5302.20(c)(5). Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Tennessee have recently enacted legislation effecting a revocation
of provisions for the settlor's former spouse in revocable inter vivos trusts. Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 1339.62; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 175; Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-50-115
(applies to revocable and irrevocable inter vivos trusts unless, among other things,
"the trust agreement . .. expressly provides otherwise."). Statutes in Michigan,
Oklahoma, and Texas relate to the consequence of divorce on life-insurance and
retirement-plan beneficiary designations. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 178; Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 552.101; Texas Family Code § 3.632, -.633.
16 The statute is inapplicable if provided otherwise in the governing instrument,
a court order, or a contract relating to the division of the marital estate made
between the divorced individuals before or after the marriage, divorce, or
annulment.
17 If Ben's retirement plan was covered by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), there is a danger that the proposed statutory provision will
be preempted. Section 514(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), provides that the
provisions of Titles I and IV of ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" governed
by ERISA. There are a variety of arguments as to why ERISA should not preempt
the proposed statutory provision in the Uniform Laws project; these are too
complicated to state here, but they are stated in the Official Commentary to that
provision. In case these arguments do not prevail, however, and the proposed
statutory provision is found preempted, the proposed statutory provision imposes
an offsetting personal liability on the recipient in the amount of any payment
received as a result of preemption.
18 In several cases, including Clymer v. Mayo, supra note 10, and Estate of Coffed,
46 N.Y.2d 514, 414 N.Y.S.2d 893, 387 N.E.2d 1209 (1979), the result of treating
the former spouse as if he or she predeceased the testator was that a gift in the
governing instrument was triggered in favor of relatives of the former spouse who,
after the divorce, were no longer relatives of the testator. In the Massachusetts case,
the former spouse's nieces and nephews ended up with an interest in the property.
In the New York case, the winners included the former spouse's child by a prior
marriage. For other cases to the same effect, see Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W. 2d 649
HESS LECTURE
(Iowa 1979); Bloom v. Selfon, 520 Pa. 519, 555 A. 2d 75 (1989); Estate of Graef, 124
Wis. 2d 25, 368 N.W. 2d 633 (1985).
19 The effect of revocation by this section is, of course, that the governing
instrument is given effect as if the revoked provisions were removed or stricken
therefrom at the time of the divorce or annulment. The remaining or unrevoked
provisions of the governing instrument take effect as if the divorced individual's
former spouse and relatives of the former spouse had disclaimed the revoked
provisions.
20 Some of these studies were based on an examination of the probated wills of
similarly situated decedents who died during a particular time frame in a particular
locality. E.g., M. Sussman, J. Cates, and D. Smith, The Family and Inheritance 86,
89-90, 143-45 (1970); Browder, Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States
and England, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1303, 1307-08 (1969); Dunham, The Method, Process
and Frequency of Wealth Transmissions at Death, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 241, 252 (1963);
Gibson, Inheritance of Community Property in Texas-A Need for Reform, 47 Tex. L. Rev.
359, 364-66 (1969); Price, The Transmission of Wealth at Death in a Community Property
Jurisdiction, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 277, 283, 311-17 (1975).
Other studies were based on interviews with living persons. Fellows, Simon, and
Rau, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession in the
United States, 1978 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 319, 351-54, 358-64, 366-68 (found the
majority favored granting entire estate to the spouse regardless of the level of
wealth involved); Note, 63 Iowa L. Rev. 1041, 1089 (1978) (found the percentage
who favored granting the entire estate to the spouse decreased as the level of wealth
increased). See also U.K. Law Commission, Report on Family Law: Distribution on
Intestacy, 1989, No. 187, at 28 (reporting that 72 percent of respondents favored
granting the entire estate to the surviving spouse if the decedent owned a house and
the decedent's children were grown up, 79 percent favored granting the entire
estate to the surviving spouse if the decedent had a house and young children, and
79 percent favored granting the entire estate to the surviving spouse if the decedent
had no house but young children).
21 A recent report of the U.K. Law Commission recommended raising the
surviving spouse's intestate share to the entire estate in all circumstances. U.K. Law
Commission, supra note 20, at 8-12.
22 M. Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law 238 (1989).
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 239.
25 Id. at 238.
26 Id. at 240.
27 If the decedent is childless, the surviving spouse is officially granted the entire
intestate estate only if the decedent leaves no surviving parent. If the decedent does
leave a surviving parent, the surviving spouse is granted the first $200,000 (actually,
the first $243,000 when the probate exemptions and allowances are added in) plus
three-fourths of the remaining balance. Very few intestate estates exceed $243,000,
and fewer still exceed this value by any substantial margin. Thus, in almost all cases,
the surviving spouse in practice will receive the entire intestate estate even if the
decedent is childless but leaves a surviving parent.
Why not, then, officially grant the surviving spouse the entire intestate estate when
the decedent is childless but leaves a surviving parent? The rationale is that a
childless decedent with a surviving spouse and at least one surviving parent and with
an estate significantly in excess of $243,000 who dies intestate is likely to have died
fairly young and without expecting to have such a large estate. (A decedent who
actually accumulated an estate of this size is likely to be older and to have a will. See
Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 20, at 336-39, reporting that, among those
surveyed, 69 percent with estates of $200,000 and over had wills (the $200,000
figure is adjusted for inflation between the time of the publication of this article and
today); and further reporting that 61 percent of those age 46-54 had wills, 63
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percent age 55-64 had wills, and 85 percent of those 65 and over had wills, but only
12 percent of those between the ages of 17 and 34 had wills.)
An intestate estate of this size is, in fact, likely to consist of a large tort recovery.
Consider Ben and Elaine again. Suppose that shortly after their marriage, Ben was
injured on his way to work by a negligent truck driver employed by a large, publicly
held corporation, and that Ben eventually died from those injuries. Suppose further
that his estate, swelled by a tort recovery stemming from the accident, amounted to
a million dollars. Disregarding the probate exemptions and allowances for the sake
of simplicity, the formula adopted has the advantage of granting Elaine (who might
well remarry) a thoroughly adequate share of $800,000 ($200,000 plus $600,000),
with a $200,000 return to Ben's parents (who bore the cost of raising and educating
Ben).
28 To be sure, the statute could invoke the statutory-trust approach only in estates
above a certain value, or only as to that portion of the estate in excess of a certain
value. But a moment's reflection suggests that this is not completely satisfactory,
either. If the statutory-trust approach were invoked in estates above a certain value,
say $150,000, too many estates would fall just above or just below the line, with
dramatically different outcomes. An estate of $149,000 would not go into a
statutory trust, but one of $151,000 would. Similarly, if the statutory-trust approach
were invoked only as to that portion of the estate in excess of a certain value, again,
say $150,000, an estate of $151,000 would produce a statutory trust of a mere
$1,000.
Since the terms of the statutory trust would likely provide that the statutory
trustee should invade the corpus for the benefit of the surviving spouse only in case
of need, taking into account the survivor's other sources of income, a small statutory
trust might not be quickly dissipated.
The problem would not be solved by the further step of directing a statutory trust
only if the estate were large enough to produce a statutory trust of at least a certain
size, say $50,000. Under this scheme, the trust would arise only if the estate
exceeded the minimum $150,000 figure by $50,000. This approach suffers from
the same arbitrariness seen before-an estate of $199,000 would not have a
statutory trust, but one of $201,000 would have one of $51,000.
29 Note, however, the possibility of a decedent who dies intestate having taken
indirect measures to disinherit the surviving spouse by means of depleting the
intestate estate by gifts or will substitutes. By couching the discussion in terms of a
decedent who disinherits the surviving spouse directly by will, I do not intend to
indicate that the elective share is unavailable or never taken in the case of an
intestate estate.
30 M. Glendon, supra note 22, at 131.
31 Id.
32 1 use the term "community-property system" to include that version of
community law adopted in the Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA), enacted in
modified form in Wisconsin.
33 In 1989, Professor Oldham reported that "Mississippi is the only state that has
not clearly accepted [the equitable-distribution] system. See Jones v. Jones, 532 So.2d
574 (Miss. 1988)." Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 Family L.Q.
219, 219 n.1 (1989).
For a fascinating account of how this system swept the country, see Glendon,
Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal Unions, in The Cambridge
Lectures 245 (N. Eastham & B. Krivy eds. 1981).
34 J. Gregory, The Law of Equitable Distribution 1.03, at p. 1-6 (1989).
35 N.Y. Est. Powers & Tr. Law § 5-1.1(c)(1)(B) (elective share of one-third if the
decedent is survived by one or more issue; one-half in all other cases).
36 Data published by the federal government reveal that, within the widowed and
divorced population at large, not disaggregated by age, about 21 percent of
widowed men and about 8 percent of widowed women remarry; and about 83
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percent of divorced men and 78 percent of divorced women remarry. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Services, supra note 3, at 12. The average (mean) ages at the time
of remarriage of widowed men and women have been steadily increasing, to 60.2
for men and 52.6 for women in 1983, the latest year for which statistics have been
published, up from 57.7 for men and 50.3 for women in 1970. The average (mean)
ages at remarriage of divorced men and women have also been steadily increasing,
but the ages are, of course, much lower. The average (mean) ages for 1983 are 37.3
for men and 33.7 for women, up from 36.7 for men and 32.8 for women in 1970.
Id., Table 4, at 24.
In 1983, the average intervals between becoming widowed and remarriage for the
65-and-older age group were 3.6 years for men and 7.9 years for women. The
average intervals between divorce and remarriage for the same age group were 6.3
years for men and 10.4 years for women. Id. at 13.
Within the 65-years-and-older population, 2.62 percent of divorced men and .049
percent of divorced women remarried during 1983. During that same year, the
remarriage rate of widowed men and women age 65 and older was 1.68 percent for
men and .019 percent for women. Within the divorced population ages 60 to 64 for
that same year, 4.93 percent of divorced men and 1.29 percent of divorced women
remarried; figures were not given for the widowed population ages 60 to 64 for that
or any other year. The remarriage rates within the 65-and-older divorced and
widowed segments of the population have been trending downward, but not in a
straight line. The data show peaks and valleys over the course of the 1970-83
period. The peak occurred during the year 1975, when 3.14 percent of divorced
men, .091 percent of divorced women, 1.95 percent of widowed men, and .021
percent of widowed women remarried. Data for 1975 for the 60 to 64 years age
group were not reported. Id., Table 3, at 23.
These remarriage rates, of course, do not reveal the remarriage rates of divorced
or widowed men and women age 65 and older or 60 to 64; they merely reveal the
remarriage rates for a given year. Because such remarriages accumulate within the
population, the incidence of remarriage later in life appears to be significant.
37 See W. Macdonald, Fraud on the Widow's Share 156-57 (Michigan Legal
Studies 1960). Of the forced-share cases in the law reports up to the time of writing
and in which the author could identify the relationships, more than half pitted
children of a former marriage against a later spouse.
Statistically, "on average, women ending first marriages had 1.06 children under
18 years, those ending second marriages had 0.64 children, and those ending third
marriages had 0.36 children. These differences are due at least in part to the fact
that most children are born into first marriages and may not be mentioned on
divorce records of subsequent marriages unless custody becomes an issue." U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Services, supra note 3, at 3.
38 E.g., Comment, Spousal Disinheritance: The New York Solution-A Critique of
Forced Share Legislation, 7 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 881, 903-08 (1985).
39 The various schemes are canvassed, state-by-state, in L. Golden, Equitable
Distribution of Property (1983); J. Gregory, The Law of Equitable Distribution
(1989); G. McLellan, Equitable Distribution Law and Practice (1985); J. Oldham,
Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property (1989).
40 J. Oldham, supra note 39, at § 3.03; see also McKnight, Defining Property Subject
to Division at Divorce, 23 Family L.Q. 193 (1989).
41 But see J. Oldham, supra note 39, at § 13.02[1][i] (noting judicial reluctance to
divide property acquired before the marriage or during the marriage by gift or
inheritance "unless the circumstances warrant.").
42 See J. Gregory, supra note 39, at 9.03. In Brown v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 528
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986), for example, fault was shown, among other things, by
evidence that the wife "talked to [the husband] like he was dirt, hurt his feelings,
made him nervous. .. "
43 The factors are discussed in J. Gregory, supra note 39, at ch. 8; J. Oldham,
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supra note 39, at § 13.02-.03. Professor McNight reports that "as many as
thirty-eight factors have been identified that may be considered in equitable
distribution [citing Note, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 415, 439 n.170 (1981)1." McNight,
supra note 40, at 197 n.14.
44 One commentator has described the equitable distribution process as follows:
Most equitable distribution statutes set out a list of factors that a court
must consider when distributing property. In a few jurisdictions where the
statutes do not contain factors, appellate courts have developed and
articulated them for the guidance of the trial courts. At the same time, it
is abundantly clear that no particular factors are intended to be more
important than any others. In the final analysis, judicial discretion is the
hallmark of equitable distribution.
A much debated point among lawyers, legislators, and others engaged
in drafting equitable distribution legislation is whether equal division is
most equitable. The question is far from resolved and perhaps never will
be. In a small minority of jurisdictions, the statutes contain a presumption
of equal division of marital property. In a few others, the courts have
created a fifty-fifty starting point for division, even while rejecting a
presumption of equal division. Some states reject altogether both pre-
sumptions and starting points.
J. Gregory, supra note 39, at 8.01. See also J. Oldham, supra note 39, at § 13.02[2]
(noting and lamenting the arbitrary results produced by giving trial courts such
great discretion).
45 Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 La. L. Rev. 1553, 1556 (1984).
The discretionary characteristic of equitable-division law resembles the probate-
law system that prevails in England and the Commonwealth, called Testator's
Family Maintenance (TFM). TFM empowers a judge to vary the testator's will in
order "to make reasonable financial provision" for the surviving spouse. Inheritance
(Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, c. 63, § 1. In making this
determination, the court can weigh the competing equities of the children of a prior
marriage; the adequacy of the spouse's own resources; the spouse's age; and "the
duration of the marriage." Id. §§ 3(l)(a), 3(2)(a). TFM remits to judicial discretion
every important issue of policy in forced-share law. For a lucid critique of TFM, see
Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60
Tul. L. Rev. 1165 (1986).
46 Kwestel & Seplowitz, Testamentary Substitutes-A Time for Statutory Clarification,
23 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 467, 472 n.22 (1988).
47 See Oldham, Should the Surviving Spouse's Forced Share Be Retained?, 38 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 223, 245-47 (1987) (favoring the forced-share community approach).
48 An analogue to this approach exists in the community-property states of
California and Washington. These states apply a strict deferred-community ap-
proach to the case of "quasi-community" property. The quasi-community property
concept addresses the problem migratory spouses; it treats as quasi-community
property property that was acquired elsewhere that would have been characterized
as community property had the spouses been under the community regime when
the property was acquired. In California and Washington, such property is
automatically retitled at death, hence invoking a strict deferred-community ap-
proach. Cal. Prob. Code § 101 (Supp. 1989); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.16.220-250
(Supp. 1989).
49 An analogue to this approach exists in the community-property states of Idaho
and Wisconsin, with respect to quasi-community property. For an explanation of
quasi-community property, see supra note 48. These states give a surviving spouse
a right to elect to take a half share of the couple's quasi-community property, hence
invoking a forced-share deferred-community approach. Idaho Code §§ 15-2-101 to
-209 (1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 851.055, 861.02 (Supp. 1989).
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50 For the reasons set forth infra note 63, the strict deferred-community approach
is not as promising as the forced-share community approach.
51 See J. Oldham, supra note 39, at § 3.03[5] ("In a few community property
states, community property must be divided equally. [Citing Cal. Civ. Code § 4800].
Most of these states, however, permit an equitable division of the community estate.
[Citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-318; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 125.180; Tex. Fain. Code
§ 3.63]."); see also Reppy, Major Events in the Evolution of American Community Property
Law and Their Import to Equitable Distribution States, 23 Family L.Q. 163, 164 (1989).
52 Alternatively, in terms of the marital-sharing or partnership theory, the
couple's implied bargain upon entering the marriage was one of equal splitting of
the proceeds of the marriage, unless the couple opted out of that implied bargain
by entering into a premarital or postmarital agreement.
53 Langbein & Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 22 Real Prop.
Prob. & Tr. J. 303, 320-21 (1987).
54 Had we decided to adopt a deferred-community forced share, subsidiary
questions such as whether income generated by and appreciation in value of
separate property during the marriage are marital or separate property would
undoubtedly have been resolved in accordance with the rules provided in the
Uniform Marital Property Act. For a discussion of these issues under the various
community and equitable-distribution regimes, see Wenig, The Increase of Value of
Separate Property During Marriage: Examination and Proposals, 23 Family L.Q. 301
(1989).
55 For a discussion of tracing-to-source and associated problems in equitable-
distribution law, see Oldham, supra note 33.
56 See M. Glendon, supra note 22, at 124 (Even title-based systems are "not always
simple in practical application .... Complexity creeps in because in most households
the assets of the spouses tend to be mingled rather than kept separate or neatly
earmarked."); see also Oldham, supra note 33.
Jane Bryant Quinn, the columnist, has written that married couples divide into
two camps--"poolers" and "splitters." Poolers put all their earnings into a single
marital account; savings, investments, and the house are held jointly; even
inheritances tend to straggle toward the common pot. Splitters keep their money
separate. The longer splitters are married, the more they edge towards forms of
pooling. Quinn, Marriage and Money-Keeping the Peace, Woman's Day, June 16,
1987, p. 18.
57 See Levy, An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 Family L.Q. 147, 152-53
(1989) (noting, in the context of equitable-distribution law, that "the stronger the
presumption [in favor of characterizing all property as marital property], the less
likely it will be that the spouse who owned nonmarital property at marriage or
received some during the marriage will try to trace the property or funds;" and that
the weaker the presumption, the more likely it will be that tracing issues will be
litigated.).
58 The supplemental elective-share amount is explained infra, text accompanying
notes 65-67.
59 Unlike the short-term marriage between Elaine and Carl, a certain fraction of
later-in-life marriages will endure for 15 or more years, giving the surviving spouse
the right to an elective-share percentage of 50 percent, or will endure for a period
not substantially less than 15 years, giving the surviving spouse the right to a
near-50 percent elective-share percentage. As reported supra note 36, the average
(mean) age at the time of remarriage of widowed men who remarry is 60.2 and of
widowed women who remarry is 52.6. Given that average life expectancy is 75 years,
remarriages that take place at ages 60.2 and 52.6, respectively, can easly endure for
the required 15-year period in order to reach the maximum 50 percent elective-
share percentage.
60 In statutory terms, the couple's combined assets come under the term
"augmented estate." As defined in proposed section 2-202, the "augmented estate"
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is (in general terms) composed of the decedent's and the surviving spouse's
property.
61 This example assumes that Ben entirely disinherited Elaine, i.e., that nothing
passed to Elaine by testate or intestate succession, nor by nonprobate transfers, such
as life insurance or by right of survivorship under a joint tenancy or a joint bank
account. If any property does pass to Elaine by any of these methods, these assets
count first toward making up Elaine's elective-share entitlement.
62 Remember that under the Uniform Probate Code's augmented-estate system,
the couple's combined assets extend well beyond the so-called probate assets and
include such items as the couple's home (even if held in joint tenancy), life
insurance, and pension benefits.
63 Notice that the redesigned system does not seek to equalize the marital assets
in this case by giving Ben's estate a claim to a portion of Elaine's property. As noted
in the text, under the redesigned system, Elaine would have no claim against Ben's
estate, because Elaine has already been disproportionately compensated as judged
by the marital-sharing principle; this is in contrast to conventional forced-share law,
where Elaine would be entitled to magnify the disproportion by claiming an
additional $66,667.
Under the redesigned system, one might think that Ben's estate ought to have a
claim against Elaine's property. But to provide such a claim would be inconsistent
with the notion of a forced-share system. In the noncommunity-property states, the
forced share has traditionally been viewed as an entitlement for the personal benefit
of the surviving spouse, not for the benefit of the beneficiaries of a spouse's estate.
Because of this, the redesigned elective-share system does not recognize the
partnership/marital-sharing interest of the decedent spouse; if it did, the forced
share would benefit the beneficiaries of the decedent spouse's estate, not the
decedent spouse.
To be sure, the community-property system does protect the decedent's interest
as well, and in this respect the redesigned elective share differs from the
community-property system. Community-like mutuality in noncommunity forced-
share law would require granting to the estate of the deceased spouse a claim
against the assets of the surviving spouse. Such a right of election would have to
devolve upon the decedent's personal representative, where it would resemble
somewhat the situation in current law in which a fiduciary makes the election on
behalf of a surviving spouse who is incompetent. Administratively, there would be
at least two ways of handling the situation. One is to authorize the decedent spouse's
personal representative to make the election. Because the decedent spouse's
personal representative would owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of that
spouse's estate, the election would become virtually automatic when not waived by
a well-drafted instrument, in contrast to the present situation in which the forced
share is actually exercised only rarely, in cases of deliberate disinheritance of the
survivor. The other way of handling the situation would be to authorize the
decedent spouse's personal representative to make an election only if the decedent
spouse's will authorized or directed that the election be made. This approach is less
objectionable than the other one because it would reduce the number of elections.
But even this approach does not square with the traditional notion that the forced
share is for the personal benefit of the surviving spouse. Thus the redesigned
system leaves the parties where they are in this situation, and provides neither with
a claim against the other's assets.
64 Under the redesigned system, the portion of the surviving spouse's assets that
counts toward making up the elective-share amount is derived by applying a
percentage to the survivor's assets equal to double the elective-share percentage. In
the case of Elaine and Carl, the elective-share percentage is 15 percent, which means
that 30 percent of Carl's assets are counted first toward making up the elective-share
amount.
To explain why this is appropriate requires further elaboration of the underlying
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theory of the redesigned system. The system avoids the tracing-to-source problem
by applying an ever-increasing percentage to the couple's combined assets without
regard to when or how those assets were acquired, rather than applying a constant
percentage (50 percent) to an ever-growing level of assets. By approximation, the
redesigned system equates the elective-share percentage of the couple's combined
assets with 50 percent of the couple's marital assets-assets subject to equalization
under the partnership/marital-sharing theory. Thus, in a marriage like that of
Elaine and Carl, which endured long enough for the elective-share percentage to
be 15 percent, the redesigned system equates 15 percent of the couple's combined
assets with 50 percent of those assets that were acquired during the marriage (other
than by gift or inheritance). In the aggregate, the system counts 30 percent
($180,000) of the couple's $600,000 in combined assets as assets acquired during the
marriage (other than by gift or inheritance).
The redesigned system applies the same ratio to the asset mix of each spouse as
it does to the couple's combined assets. To say that the elective-share percentage is
15 percent means that the combined assets are treated as being in a 30/70 ratio (30
percent marital, subject to equalization; 70 percent individual, exempted from
equalization). This same ratio, in turn, governs the approximation of each spouse's
mix of marital and individual property. Consequently, the redesigned system
attributes 30 percent of Elaine's $300,000 ($90,000) to marital property and the
other 70 percent ($210,000) to individual property. And, the system does the same
for Carl's $300,000, i.e., it treats 30 percent ($90,000) as marital property and 70
percent ($210,000) as individual property.
Accordingly, Carl is treated as already owning $90,000 of the $180,000 of marital
property. Or, to say this in elective-share terminology, $90,000 of Carl's $90,000
elective-share amount comes from-Carl's own assets, giving Carl the right to claim
nothing from Elaine's net probate estate. (Remember that $90,000 of Elaine's assets
are attributed to marital property; thus, each partner already owned his or her
respective 50 percent share of the marital-property component of their combined
assets.)
65 Note, however, that although in this last example, the redesigned system gave
Carl no claim against Elaine's assets, there is a further safeguard built into the
system. As explained next, the redesigned system has another prong-the support-
theory prong. Do bear in mind that in the example we just discussed, if the dollar
values were much lower, Carl would have a claim against Elaine's estate to be
brought up to the $50,000 level, and that this claim is in addition to the claim for
$43,000 in probate exemptions and allowances. These rights apply regardless of the
length of the marriage.
66 The $50,000 figure is bracketed to indicate that individual states may wish to
select a higher or lower amount. For a similar proposal, including the proposal to
grant the surviving spouse a minimum elective right of $50,000, see Note, 1980 U.
111. L.F. 277, 311 (by Richard Lee Dees).
67 If the surviving spouse is incapacitated, the Uniform Laws project contains a
special provision for the management and ultimate disposition of the elective-share
amount or the supplemental elective-share amount. These amounts, to the extent
payable from the decedent's probate or reclaimable estates, are to be placed into a
custodial or support trust for the surviving spouse; enacting states are given a choice
as to whether to authorize the trustee of this trust to take governmental benefits
such as Medicaid into account in expending the assets of this trust for the spouse's
support.
For a discussion of whether under conventional forced-share law an insolvent or
Medicaid-assisted surviving spouse, incapacitated or not, can forgo an elective share
in order to defeat his or her creditors or in order to continue to qualify for
Medicaid assistance, see Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 Cornell L. Rev.
587, 640-45 (1989). See also Estate of Schoolnik, 15 Conn. L. Trib. (No. 48, Dec. 4,
1989) p. 28 (Conn. Prob. Ct., Oct. 27, 1989) (requiring a Medicaid-assisted surviving
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spouse to elect to take her statutory share). The author wishes to thank Professor
Mary Moers Wenig for bringing the Schoolnik case to his attention.
68 If a forced-share law is to have any integrity, these nominal inter vivos transfers
must be subjected to the forced-share entitlement. The same problem arises under
the federal estate tax. Having an elective share that applied only to the decedent's
probate assets would be like having a federal estate tax whose only provision is IRC
§ 2033 (which includes in the gross estate property owned at death). In the early
estate tax statutes, Congress recognized this problem and included provisions
bringing into the gross estate various types of inter-vivos transfers, such as transfers
with a retained power to revoke, transfers with a retained life estate, joint tenancies,
and life insurance. The state elective-share system must do the same, and the UPC's
augmented-estate concept or something akin to it is the method to follow, rather
than to throw it to the judiciary to try to erect stop-gap measures on a case-by-case
basis, as in cases such as Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, 460 N.E.2d 572 (1974)
or Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
69 The earlier approach to the problem took the form of the common-law
doctrines, sometimes codified, revoking a person's will if he or she later married.
As forced-share statutes came to replace dower and curtesy, the forced share was
thought to provide sufficient protection in the situation of a premarital will.
70 The actual terms of the proposed statute do not speak of children by a prior
marriage, but of "a child of the testator who was born before the testator married
the surviving spouse and who is not a child of the surviving spouse" and of "a
descendant of such a child."
